INCARCERATION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT: AN ASSERTED EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
FACES A SEMANTICAL DEFENSE
In re Farr,36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974)
There can, of course, be acts which constitute both civil and criminal contempt. If a witness refuses, without proper cause, to testify, after being ordered to do so by the court, this constitutes a
criminal contempt, since the witness defies the authority of the
court, and a civil contempt, since the witness deprives a litigant of
testimony he is entitled to under court order . ...

However, the

question arises whether such a commitment (for civil contempt)
may, in a particular case, become so oppressive as to warrant relief. 1
The problem rhetorically posed above has been raised with increasing frequency by individuals incarcerated for civil contempt.
The "oppressive" commitment has been challenged on constitutional grounds, which attack has been narrowed to one specific assertion: indefinite incarceration for civil contempt constitutes
2
cruel and/or unusual punishment.
The constitutional challenge is factually based on the potentially
infinite imprisonment that inheres in virtually all civil contempt
citations. The argument urged in support of such commitment is
based on a judicially-created functional distinction: incarceration
for civil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature and is not
punishment, and hence does not come within the purview of the
cruel and/or unusual punishments prohibition.
The result of this distinction is unjust. One witness who refused
to testify about organized crime in New Jersey, for example, was
1. Keller, Civil and Criminal Contempt, 43 N.D. L. REv. 244, 244-245
(1966-1967). The article, written by a justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, discusses the procedural and substantive differences between
civil and criminal contempt. Unfortunately, no answer was offered by the
distinguished Justice for the question he raises as to "oppressive" commitment.
2. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) held that the eighth
amendment was applicable to the states in a case involving a California
statute that made it a misdemeanor for any person to be addicted to the
use of narcotics.
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imprisoned in 1970 for civil contempt, and spent over three years

in jail. 3 In a number of other New Jersey cases, witnesses jailed

for civil contempt have served, and are now serving, inordinately
long jail terms for consistently refusing to answer questions put
to them by the State Commission of Investigation rnncerning organized crime and racketeering in New Jersey.4
In California, the remedy of civil contempt has been frequently
applied against stubborn witnesses and resistive suitors. 5 The usage of civil contempt in California has recently generated nationwide attention as a result of its application against a California
newsman, William T. Farr, who refused to identify his news
3. Joseph A. Zicarelli was incarcerated in the Yardville Correction Center, Yardville, New Jersey on January 28, 1970, after refusing to testify
before a closed hearing of the State Commission of Investigation. On June
9, 1971, Mr. Zicarelli was transferred to the New Jersey State Prison at
Trenton pursuant to convictions for criminal offenses, and is presently incarcerated pursuant to a twelve-to-fifteen year sentence. In October of
1972, attorneys for Zicarelli filed a motion to vacate the prior order of
civil commitment, contending that the subsequent criminal convictions
superseded and dissolved the civil citation for contempt. Brief of Appellant, In the Matter of Josepn A. Zicarelli, No. L-41598-68 (Super. Ct. 1972).
This attack, which sought alternatively to have the civil commitment declared violative of the eighth amendment, was perhaps the most eloquent
and forceful attack ever to be lodged against the Commission based on
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
4. The State Commission of Investigation is a legislatively-created
temporary Commission authorized to "conduct investigations in connection
with:
a. The faithful execution and effective enforcement of the laws
of the State, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and racketeering;
b. The conduct of public officers and public employees...;
c. Any matter concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9M-2 (West 1968). The New Jersey Supreme Court
has held that "the purpose of the SCI is 'to find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for legislative and executive action' ....
[It] is in no sense an 'accusatory' body .... ." In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J.
249, 261 A.2d 129, 134 (1970).
5. The inherent contempt power of the courts has been held to include
the power to incarcerate in lieu of a fine: In re Ciraolo, 70 Cal. 2d 389,
450 P.2d 241, 74 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969); Ex parte Victor, 220 Cal. 729, 32
P.2d 608 (1934). It has also been utilized to imprison indefinitely witnesses before judicial bodies who refuse to testify under lawful order: Filipoff v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 43, 364 P.2d 315, 15 Cal Rptr. 132
(1961); cf. Crocker v. Conrey, 140 Cal. 213, 73 P. 1006 (1903) wherein it
is stated that it is a judge's duty, and not his mere discretion, to inflict
punishment for civil contempt when a witness refuses to testify.
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sources upon the court's request during a murder trial. In re
Farr,O along with In the Matter of Manna7 a New Jersey lower
court decision, amply demonstrate the eighth amendment challenge
and the government's defense to that challenge. The cases will
disclose that the functional distinction between civil contempt and
criminal contempt is in practicality a semantical distinction that
deprives those held in civil contempt not only of certain procedural
safeguards afforded criminal contemners, but subjects the violator
on the civil side to jail terms that may in many instances be in
excess of those imposed on criminal contemners and which ultimately may be in violation of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause.
IN RE FAR
On November 13, 1972, the United States Supreme Court declined
to hear the argument of William T. Farr, a reporter formerly with
the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, that the first amendment permits reporters to keep their sources confidential. Farr, a reporter
with the Los Angeles Times, was ordered in May, 1971 to show
cause before a California superior court judge why he should not
be held in contempt for refusing to reveal the sources used in his
reporting of the Charles Manson murder trials. Farr was held in
civil contempt and ordered jailed indefinitely. The California
Court of Appeal upheld the order, resting its decision on the "inherent" power of the court to control its own proceedings and officers.8 On January 8, 1974, the Court of Appeal again considered
Farr's contempt citation. While it upheld the validity of his imprisonment, the court created a heretofore unknown opportunity
for Farr to gain his freedom.9
Throughout all phases of the adjudication of the constitutional
validity of his contempt commitment, Farr relied upon California
Evidence Code section 1070-the reporter's shield statute-as justification for his refusal to comply with a court order directing him
to disclose the sources of his news story. Although Farr failed
in his initial petition for writ of review to the appellate court in
1972, he presented additional arguments in his 1974 writ of habeas
corpus. His supplemental arguments included the following:
(4) the imposition of a judgment incarcerating petitioner until
he complies with the order to identify further the persons who
-..

6. 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
7. In the Matter of Louis Anthony Manna, No. L-27299-71 (Super. Ct.
Sept. 8, 1972).
8. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1972).
9. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
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furnished him the statement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.10

The court took the position that Farr's eighth amendment argument was "contrary to compelling precedent and misconstrues the

order itself."" The court discussed briefly the nature of civil contempt, and in concluding that "petitioner's commitment is neither
punishment, cruel, nor unusual"' 2 appeared to predicate this conclusion on its own construction of the concept of civil contempt.
In the language of the court,
[a] coercive incarceration to compel compliance with an order of
court presents a special problem where disobedience of the order
is based on an established articulated moral principle ... In such
a situation, it is necessary to determine the point at which the
commitment ceases to serve its coercive purpose and becomes
punitive in character. When that point is reached so that the incarceration of the contemner becomes penal, its duration is limited
by the five day maximum sentence. provided in Code of Civil Pro-

cedure section 1218.13
The court went on to create a test for determining when a coercive commitment becomes punitive. The contemner should seek
special proceedings in the superior court to determine if there is
a "substantial likelihood that continued commitment will accomplish the purpose of the order upon which the commitment
is based."' 4 If there is a substantial likelihood of continued contumacy without the desired results, then the incarceration must
end within five days.
While the court on the one hand said that Farr's civil contempt
incarceration was not punishment, it asserted that it could become
such upon a proper showing by the contemner. The problem lies
in the elapsed time required before a proper showing can be made.
10. 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1974).
11. 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 583, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974).
12. Id.
13. 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974) (emphasis
added).
14. Id. On June 25, 1974, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Catena v.

Seidel,

-

N.J. -,

-

A.2d -

(1974), adopted a somewhat similar test,

placing on the contemner "the burden of showing that there is no reasonable likelihood that continued incarceration will cause him to break his
silence." The Trentonian, June 26, 1974, at 21, col. 4. Despite the fact
that Gerardo Catena has been imprisoned for over four years in efforts to
coerce his testimony, the court speculated that his silence may have been
influenced by the hope or advice that his attorneys had good legal grounds
in their numerous appeals over the four year period.
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Hypothetically a civil contemner could attempt to show, after a
period of time in jail, that there is no longer any substantial likelihood that the desired testimony is forthcoming. If he should fail
in his first efforts but succeed at a later date, the contemner may
well have served an unusually long jail term for a civil contempt
that ultimately is branded punitive by a court. Through an apparently magical transformation, a once-solely coercive commitment
becomes only punitive. The court insists, however, that while the
incarceration becomes characterized as punishment, it can not be
cruel and unusual punishment.
IN THE MATTER OF MANNA

On July 19, 1972, Louis Anthony "Bobby" Manna, pursuant to
subpoena, appeared with counsel before the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation to answer questions on organized crime
and racketeering in Northern New Jersey. 15 Mr. Manna's appearance before the Commission, delayed for over three months due
to adjournments requested by him and due to an unsuccessful motion to quash the subpoena, culminated in the witness' refusal to
be sworn. On that same day, the Mercer County Superior Court
found the witness in civil contempt of the Commission and ordered
him confined to jail until such time as he purged himself of contempt. 1 "Bobby" Manna thus joined eight other prospective witnesses subpoenaed by the Commission, all of whom were incarcer17
ated for indefinite terms for refusing to testify.
Following the tack of his fellow contemners, Manna filed a mo-

15. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9M-12(c) (West 1970) authorizes the State
Commission of Investigation to subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance at investigative hearings.
16. N.J. STAT. AN. § 52:9M-12(e) (West 1970) provides, in pertinent
part,
If any person subpoenaed pursuant to this section shall neglect
or refuse to obey the command of the subpoena, any judge of the
Superior Court... or any municipal magistrate may... proceed
against such person as for a contempt of court.
Similar authority is granted to California courts by CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§§ 1209 (9), 1991 (West 1972).
17. Pursuing its investigative role, the State Commission of Investigation has summoned since its inception hundreds of witnesses to testify
about various areas of crime and corruption in New Jersey. Those witnesses refusing to testify, fearing self-incrimination, are granted immunity
from the use of their responsive answers against them. For a detailed
discussion of the constitutional sufficiency of "use + fruits" immunity in
supplanting the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:9M-1, 2, 17 subds. a, b (West
1970).
18. Specifically, Angelo Bruno Annaloro, Gerardo Catena, Anthony
Russo and Joseph A. Zicarelli have filed extensive appeals, all unsuccessful.
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tion seeking a stay of proceedings.1 8 His brief in support of that
motion contained a plethora of constitutional attacks on the Commission, most of them already litigated and determined to be without merit by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.19 The final challenge in Manna's brief, and the one which warrants further discussion, is that the "indeterminate feature of the contempt procedure constitutes cruel and unusual punishment .... ":
Lastly, it is submitted that... "the words of the Eighth Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the presence of a maturing society." (citations
omitted). As set forth in Weems. . . "The clause of the Constitution... may therefore be progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire new meaning
as public opinion becomes
2
enlightened by a humane justice." 0
Unfortunately, Mr. Manna did not attempt to develop or relate the
facts of his case to the potentially vague judicial language he argues
is supportive of his challenge. The response by the Commission to
Manna and others, however, has been consistent throughout:
We must first consider whether a civil contempt incarceration is
"punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Civil contempt is employed as a coercive sanction to compel the
witness to do what the law made it his duty to do. (citation omitted). The purpose of civil contempt is to offer a litigant a remedy
against an opponent's refusal to do what he is supposed to do.
The purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of
the court by punishing the wrongdoer. (citation omitted). This
distinction according to purpose indicates that a party incarcerated
under civil contempt is not enduring a sanction which the Eighth
Amendment intended to limit. It is long settled that such a man
"carries the keys to his prison" in his own pocket. (citation omitted). He need not be incarcerated at all. In Wyman v. Uphaus
(citation omitted), the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered
the 8th Amendment challenge of a man committed under civil contempt for refusing to testify before the Subversive Activities
Board. The Court held that such coercion was not punishment
within the meaning of the 8th Amendment. The Commission submits that this reasoning is still applicable. 21
The defense, then is to rely on the ostensibly non-punitive aspects of civil contempt, as opposed to the punitive nature of criminal contempt. Before examining both forms of contempt in de19. In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970).
20. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, In the Matter of Louis Anthony Manna,
No. L-27299-71 (Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1972).
21. Brief for Respondent at 24-25, In the Matter of Louis Anthony
Manna, No. L-27299-71 (Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1972).
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tail, it is instructive to look at traditional judicial interpretation
of the cruel and unusual punishments clause.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
A Question of Semantics?
The California Supreme Court has stated that ..
the Constitution affords protection in that it prohibits the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishments . .. [but] this inhibition relates to the
character of the punishment, and imprisonment is neither cruel
nor unusual. '22 The prevailing view was that imprisonment, absent other circumstances, could not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 23 The landmark decision of In re Lynch reversed this
view, at least insofar as the California Constitutional prohibition
was concerned, in that the decision held that imprisonment pursuant to a challenged indeterminate sentence statute was cruel and
unusual within the meaning of the California Constitution.24
There are at least three operative tests of what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment as applied by the United States Supreme
Court:
1) if the punishment is of such a character as to shock the conscience or
to be intolerable to fundamental fairness, it is cruel and
25
unusual;
2) although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, it goes
beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim-that is, it is
"un26
necessarily cruel" in view of the purpose for which it is used;
3) if it is greatly disproportionate to the offense for which it is
imposed, it is cruel and unusual (the Weems test).27

It is the Weems test that has been relied upon most frequently
by the New Jersey contemners in their unsuccessful eighth amendment challenges. The argument, as it has been developed, states
that while the interest of the state (and the private litigant) might
be compelling, it may be proportionately less than the potential
length of imprisonment warrants. While the New Jersey courts
22. In re Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 415, 177 P. 162, 165 (1918), citing State
v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429 (1860).
23. Circumstances that constitute cruel and unusual punishment have included "strip cell" confinement at Soledad prison: Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); see also McWilliams v. United States,
394 F.2d 41, 48 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1044 (1969), where
a lengthy prison term for a drug conviction was held to be not per se
cruel and unusual punishment.
24. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921 (1972).
25. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
26. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (dissenting opinion
of Goldberg, J.); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.).
27. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).
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have rejected the Weems argument presumably because Weems
dealt with punishment for criminal offenses, it is suggested by this
writer that the nature and subject matter of the desired testimony
might play at least a small part in motivating the court to reject
the challenge.

28

The recent Supreme Court decision banning the use of the death
penalty on eighth amendment grounds sheds light on the trend
of the Court's thinking in this area:
But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the Constitutional sense because it was thought justified
by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it
ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would
violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for
its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction
of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the
State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment ... 29

Arguably, an unsuccessful and lengthy civil commitment that provides such negligible returns to the litigant seeking civil contempt
through the courts might also be patently excessive. 30 "At bottom,
then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments ....

Yet the

Framers also knew 'that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws
other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.' '"31
Such an example is found in Trop v. Dulles, cited by Mr. Manna
and specifically referred to in the recent death penalty decisions:
".... [o]f course, a punishment may be degrading simply by reason of its enormity. A prime example is expatriation ... for it

necessarily involves a denial by society of the individual's existence
28. In New Jersey, the Commission was attempting to obtain information on the activities and pervasiveness of organized crime. Normally, the
witnesses who refused to testify were reputed members of organized crime
"families", and as such, arguably had much to lose by cooperating with
the Commission in their investigation.
29. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (concurring opinion of
White, J.) (emphasis added).
30. There are, of course, returns to the state and private litigant which
are not necessarily anticipated at the time of the content citation. For
the State Commission of Investigation, the "return" is the suppression of
organized crime through the imprisonment of reputed crime "leaders".
31. Furman v. Georgia, supra note 29, at 270 (concurring opinion of
Brennan, J.), citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
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as a member of the human community. 8 2 While a lengthy coercive imprisonment may be "enormous", however, reliance on Trop
is argued as being misplaced for several reasons, the most important being that Trop involved punishment inflicted for criminal
convictions. Further, the distinguishing factor in nearly all the
previously cited cases in support of the challenge is that they all
deal with punishments over which the defendant has no control,
and such is not the case with civil contempt. Finally, the cases
relied upon all deal with a criminal "defendant," a classification
which Mr. Manna, Mr. Farr and other civil contemners technically
fail to fit into because of the "distinction according to purpose"
made between civil and criminal contempt actions.
Civil vs. Criminal Contempt
While the double violation of civil and criminal contempt depicted at the beginning of this comment may be accurate in theory,
the practice of the State Commission of Investigation, grand juries
and similar investigative bodies has been to seek commitment for
civil contempt only, thus alleviating the need for the procedural
safeguards afforded criminal contemners, and permitting, albeit
unintentionally, reliance on the remedial and ostensibly non-punitive nature of the commitment in responding to the constitutional
challenges.
Civil contempt is a curious descendant from the common law.
In its early application in the United States, it was part of the
equitable process to enforce a judgment, 8 and was available only
against resistive suitors who were capable of meeting the judgment.8 4 Civil contempt has been held by the Supreme Court to
be inherent to judicial power,85 without the need for statutory authority, although many states have provided by statute for coercive
imprisonment in selected situations. Thus the State Commission
of Investigation's enabling statute contains a provision wherein
"any person subpoenaed [who] shall neglect or refuse to obey the
command of the subpoena .

.

. may [be] proceeded against . . .

as for a contempt of court" before an appropriate court.3 0 A similar statute exists on the federal level.3 7
32. 408 U.S. 238, 273-274 (1972), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958).
33. Kirchner v. Kirchner, 5 N.J. Super. 341, 69 A.2d 30 (1949).
34. Ex parte Karlson, 160 Cal. 378, 117 P. 447 (1911).

35. Doyle v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 607

(1906).
36. See note 16 supra.

37. 18 U.S.C. 401 (1948) provides, in pertinent part:
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Civil contempt is recognized as being coercive and remedial.3 8
Upon a party's refusal to comply with a legal order, the adverse
party aggrieved by such noncompliance may seek a commitment
order to imprison the violator until the desired information is obtained. The action is pursued to benefit the complainant to whose
detriment the contemner's refusal inures-the violator presumably
having the ability to perform. 3 9 Imprisonment is seen as the an-

swer by the courts to compel performance (rather than to punish
noncompliance). Hence the contemner is jailed indefinitely, 40 and
his release conditioned only upon his performance of the requested
act. 41

One of the few requirements imposed upon the court is

that: "before a person is subject to punishment for violating a
command of the court, he should be informed in definite terms
as to the duties imposed upon him. ' 42 The only limitation on the
term of imprisonment is the "doing of some act"43 which is capable
(arguably) of being done immediately.44 The imprisoned man
"carries the keys of his prison door in his own pocket." 45

Criminal contempt, in comparison, is purely punitive, and seeks
to vindicate the authority of the court. 46 Because the contemptuous conduct is deemed "criminal", a panoply of rights and procedural safeguards become available to the contemner that are not
available to the individual cited for civil contempt. For example,
the individual facing criminal contempt has a right to a jury (if
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine

or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority,
and none other, as...
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree or command.

In addition, 26 U.S.C. 7402(b) (West 1967) gives the United States district
court jurisdiction for civil contempt in cases involving the Internal Revenue Service.

38. In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 1941); Morelli v. Superior

Court, 1 Cal. 3d 328, 461 P.2d 655, 82 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1969).
39. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947); In re Salkin, 5 Cal. App. 2d 436, 438, 42 P.2d 1041 (1935).
40. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
41. Lathrop v. Lathrop, 50 N.J. Super. 525, 142 A.2d 920 (1958).
42. Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1939).
43. Lathrop v. Lathrop, supra note 41, at 531, 142 A.2d 926 (1958).
44. Id.
45. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902); Staley v. South Jersey

Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A. 1042 (1914).
46. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941).
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the sentence imposed is six months or more) and to bail, and if convicted may receive clemency or pardon. 4 Once convicted, the
criminal contemner receives a fixed sentence. 48 The individual
cited for civil contempt may take advantage of none of these procedural guarantees.
Despite the differences between the two types of contempt, confusion is often experienced by both the legislature and the courts,
49
and the terms are often interchangeably used.
Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co. seems at first glance to
set forth the general rule:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of
cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial and
for the benefit of the complainant But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the
court.5 0

In comparison, the Illinois supreme court has held that
[in civil contempt proceedings the order entered serves two pur-

poses. In addition to vindicating the authority and dignity of the

court, it also advances the relief granted to a party to the litiga-

tion.51

The United States Supreme Court attempts to explain this apparent confusion away by referring in Gompers to the vindication of
judicial authority as an incidental effect. "[I]f the case is civil
and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication
of the court's authority .

. .

. But such indirect consequences will

not change imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial
'52
into that which is solely punitive in character, or vice versa.
Yet the California Court of Appeal in Farr found that a coercive
imprisonment could become punitive and penal in its effect.53
To further confuse the issue, the Supreme Court has held that
"[i] t may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belong47. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
48. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946); see also note
40 supra.
49. N.C. Grnq. STAT. §§ 5-1(6), 5-8 (1953) refers only to "contempt", although there are various types of contempt described in the statute. In
re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129, 141 (1970) held that

[lt would be helpful if legislative draftsmen abided by our semantics, but we cannot insist that they shall. Our responsibility re-

mains to find and enforce the legislative intent.
See also Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904), which refers
to a single, sui generis contempt action.
50. 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
51. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736, 740-741 (1949).
52. 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911) (emphasis added).
53. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
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ing to either one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both. '54 Curiously enough, in affirming a criminal
contempt conviction for a violation of a restraining order, the
Court in the same case announced that "his case, therefore, comes
more fully within the punitive than the remedial class. It should
be regarded like misconduct in a court room or disobedience of
a subpoena."5 5 Yet disobedience of a subpoena normally involves
a contemner refusing to do something which he is legally obligated
to do and capable of doing, and hence is equally as much a civil
contempt as it is a criminal contempt.
The ultimate confusion is manifested in United States v. DiMauro, where the defendant was subpoenaed before a grand jury
to testify about gambling and racketeering activities.56 He was
granted immunity from prosecution but refused to testify. The
United States Attorney moved for both civil and criminal contempt, but the Court felt that the defendant's actions were "much
more serious than civil contempt," 57 and after a criminal contempt
jury trial the defendant was sentenced to three years in prison
with the possibility of a modification of sentence under Rule
35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure if the defendant
decided to cooperate and testify.58 DiYlauro testified and the court
reduced his sentence to three years probation. The eighth circuit
affirmed Dillauro's conviction on the grounds that the purpose of
the contempt proceeding was to punish rather than to coerce.5 9
The nature of DiMauro's contempt sentence, with its built-in
"purge" contingency, was arguably more civil and coercive than
criminal. The effect in DiMauro was to afford a criminal contemner, sentenced for remedial purposes, the criminal procedural
safeguards that are unavailable to civil contemners. The obvious
intention of the court was to coerce, yet the violation was "too
serious" to be civil contempt, so the court branded it criminal.
Set against the background of Shillitani v. United States,60 the
54. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
55. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).

56. United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 431.
58. Id. at 432.

59. Id.

60. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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semantical distinction in DiMauro becomes evident. In Shillitani
the court found that the defendant should have been tried for civil
rather than criminal contempt, and announced the "primary purpose" test to determine the proper contempt action. Shillitani
asked: what does the lower court "primarily seek to accomplish"
in passing sentence? If it is to primarily coerce, then the action
must be for civil contempt.
The argument is advanced by the imprisoned contenmers that
incarceration for an indefinite period, no matter how remedial in
purpose, is punishment within the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause nonetheless. At the very least it is punishment in the eyes of the contemner. The State Commission of
Investigation dismisses this plea with the smug assertion that "the
only punishment imposed is a self-imposed, masochistic one...,,1
and hence the state is not the one imposing the punishment, and
therefore the Eighth Amendment cannot be applicable. The reasoning, however, is circular and deceptive, and is clearly contrary
to the position of the California supreme court: "[t] he danger that
persons may be imprisoned for unlimited periods for non-payment
of a fine for [civil] contempt is . .. competely removed by the
guaranty . . ." of the eighth amendment.6 2 In other words, the

court explicitly recognized that in debtor cases the eighth amendment protects against unlimited imprisonment for civil contempt.
The Supreme Court recognizes that punishment

"

. . . by govern-

ment should never be treated as civil, thus depriving the defendant
of the protection of criminal procedure, even if the action has a
remedial aspect.""" While the court was concerned with punishment inflicted pursuant to punitive action by government, the permissible inference is that the Court recognizes that imprisonment,
even if coercive, is nonetheless punishment. The semantical distinction, however, continues to haunt and undermine the civil contemner's position. "While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the
court conditions release upon the contemner's willingness to tes04
tify."

In other words, while the court is willing to concede that

coercive imprisonment is in some respects punishment, it ignores
for eighth amendment purposes the punitive aspects of a lengthy
term in jail simply because the imprisonment initially is deemed
civil and coercive.
61. Brief for Respondent at 8, State Commission of Investigation v. Ca-

tena, No. A-1205-69 (Super. Ct. 1970).

62. Ex parte Karlson, 160 Cal. 378, 117 P. 447, 449 (1911).
63. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
64. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
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The lengthy incarcerations for civil contempt in New Jersey, for
example, suggest that the coercion has failed to work, and that
any further imprisonment may continue to be futile. Recognizing
this, the continued insistence on imprisonment for coercive reasons
may become virtually vindictive.6 5 Granted, imprisonment is not
used when "there is any other adequate remedy," 66 but a point
may be reached when even imprisonment fails to fulfill the stated
purpose of its use as a "remedy". The significance of this has been
recognized by the Supreme Court: "But where the purpose is to
make the defendant comply ... the [Court] must then consider
the magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy
and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired. '67 The continued lengthy imprisonment of many of the State Commission of Investigation's contemners attests to the inadequacy of the remedy used; its remedial
purpose-coercion-has simply not been fulfilled. The Commission
responds to this fact by arguing that "[a]ppellant's inference that
he will be steadfast in his refusal to answer, and that his incarceration is thus tantamount to life imprisonment is impertinent, even
though it is not nearly as dogmatic as his outright assertion in
the New Jersey Supreme Court that he would never answer the
' 68
questions.
As impertinent and dogmatic as the contemner's assertions may
be, the resultant lengthy incarceration attests to the finality of
the witness' decision to remain mute.
Cruel and/or Unusual: Some Recent Interpretations
A recent case before the United States Supreme Court dealt specifically with the problem of indefinite imprisonment. In Jackson
v. Indiana,69 the petitioner was committed indefinitely after being
65. Ignored by the law is the additional "inhibiting" element that may
in fact be the prime motivation for the contemner to remain silent-the
fear of reprisal and retaliation if "secrets" are disclosed.
66. Burton v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 325 Mich. 159, 165, 37 N.W.2d 899,

902 (1949).
67. United States v. United Mine Workers, supra note 39, at 304 (emphasis added).
68. Brief of Respondent at 10, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission
of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
69. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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adjudged incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner claimed that such
imprisonment was violative of due process, equal protection and
the cruel and unusual punishments clause, since he may never be
found "competent" to stand trial, in which case he would be subject to a possible life sentence without ever having committed a
crime. The Court decided not to consider the eighth amendment
challenge specifically, and based its decision on the other two Constitutional grounds. Having retrospectively determined that the
petitioner would never have been found competent, the Court
found that he was proceeded against unfairly; more lenient commitment procedures should have been utilized. The Court briefly
referred to the indefinite nature of the incarceration in terms that
are clearly applicable. It was the opinion of the Court that petitioner's mental incapacity, and hence his prison term, was incapable of being remedied by him due to the unfair commitment proceedings. Since this amounted to a life imprisonment without conviction of any crime, the Court concluded that he was denied due
process from the very outset of his incarceration.
Persons adjudged in civil contempt, however, are from the outset of the contempt citation, capable of remedying their potential
prison term, and hence their imprisonment does not constitute a
violation of due process under the Jackson rationale.
There is an analogy that may be extracted from the death penalty decision, discussed earlier in this comment, that advances an
argument that is perhaps the most applicable: "The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not
be excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if
it is unnecessary. 70° Arguably, an unsuccessful punishment is severe for the ends it seeks futilely to achieve. Logically, that which
does not accomplish its aims cannot be a necessary element of the
remedy pursued, as the California Court of Appeal recognized in
In re Farr in its adoption of the "substantial likelihood" test.
Therefore, coercive imprisonment of obstinate witnesses is severe,
unnecessary and excessive, and hence is violative of the Eighth
Amendment.
The maj or weakness of such an argument is that a civil contempt
incarceration could not be deemed "excessive" or "severe" until the
contemner has served a significant term in jail-the Constitutional
challenge would have to be retrospectively argued by a contemner
who has served a long jail term. Yet the argument's weakness
may be its major strength. If some commitments are successful
70. Furman v. Georgia, supra note 29, at 279.
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and others are not, then the court cannot say with any certainty
that imprisonment is necessary to achieve the desired coercion.
DiMauro achieved its desired remedy by sentencing the witness
under criminal contempt, thereby providing the defendant with a
jury trial and a definite term in jail, subject to being reduced for
cooperation. If DiMauro had not cooperated, he might have served
a maximum of three years in prison. The contemner in a civil
contempt case does not get a jury trial, and faces the prospect of
serving time in excess of his criminal counterpart, for a violation
that is in all other respects the same. It is this combination of
factors-lack of procedural safeguards coupled with potentially infinite imprisonment-that is supportive of the eighth amendment
challenge.
The cruel or unusual punishments challenge has met its greatest
success in California in In re Lynch.71 The defendant in Lynch
claimed that an indeterminate sentence imposed for second-offense
indecent exposure was cruel or unusual in that it could amount
to a life imprisonment. After first deciding that the constitutionality of an indeterminate sentence must be viewed in light of the
72
the court held that a possible
maximum possible imprisonment,
life term for a second-offense exhibitionist was "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity."7 3 A
number of "techniques" are utilized by the court in determining
whether a particular sentence is violative of the cruel or unusual
punishments clause. The court will look to the "nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree
of danger both present to society. '7 4 Additionally, the court will
"compare the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed
in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same
'7 5
test, must be deemed more serious.
The maximum possible term for civil contempt is life imprisonment. Therefore, a person incarcerated for civil contempt meets
the tests of Lynch if he bespeaks a reasonably clean background,
71.
72.
73.
74.

8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
In re Lynch, supra note 53, at 416.
Id. at 424, citing with disapprovalIn re Garner, supra note 22.
Id. at 425.

75. Id. at 426.
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and his only offense is failure to provide information to a factfinding body that arguably is discoverable utlimately from other
sources. Remembering that the court in DiMauro characterized
criminal contempt as "more serious" than civil contempt, and recognizing that incarceration for civil contempt can be many times
longer than imprisonment for criminal contempt, Lynch strongly
suggests that the imprisonment is cruel or unusual.
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that"
the Clause imposes upon this Court the duty, when the issue is
properly presented, to determine the validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that punishment may be."76 In determining the
validity of a New Hampshire civil contempt incarceration, the
Court stated:
If appellant chooses to abide by the.., order of the New Hampshire courts he need not face jail. If, however, he continues to
disobey, we find on this record no constitutional objection to the
exercise
of the traditional remedy of contempt to secure compli77
ance.

The New Hampshire decision was handed down fifteen years ago.
Recent decisions, such as Jackson, have upheld the validity of indefinite imprisonment generally, while Lynch declared certain indeterminate sentences to be cruel or unusual. The problem and
confusion relating to the incarceration of obstinate witnesses for
civil contempt continues to suggest a constitutional infirmity yet
to be satisfactorily resolved by the courts.
CONCLUSION
The recent decisions that have attempted to explain the scope
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause suggest that, abstractly, there may be some merit in the asserted eighth amendment challenge. Before the challenge can be argued from a position of strength, however, there is at least one prerequisite. The
"distinction according to purpose" accepted by the courts must be
recognized for what it is in many instances-a semantical distinction that fails to look at the coercive imprisonment any further
than the locking of the jailhouse door. What strength there is
in the challenge, in the context of coercion to compel testiomny,
may well be found in the inherent lack of distinction between the
two types of contempt when dealing with witnesses who have no
intention of ever testifying. For the strong-willed contemner, his
imprisonment clearly predominates with punitive aspects. The
76. Furman v. Georgia, supra note 29, at 258 (emphasis added).
77. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959).
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courts must uniformly decide, as the Court of Appeal did in In
re Farr, that the remedial aspects of civil contempt incarceration
are minimal, if not non-existent, when applied to the obstinate contemner.
In re Farr represents a significant departure from precedent, in
that it holds that coercive imprisonment may be transformed into
punishment under certain circumstances. When the progressive
principles of In re Lynch are applied in a situation akin to Farr,
the implication is that a "possible maximum" jail term of life imprisonment for civil contempt may constitute cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution in the presence of factors discussed earlier in this comment. Inasmuch as the interpretation and development of the California Cruel or Unusual Punishments clause has closely paralleled the interpretation of the
eighth amendment, it is possible that the cruel and unusual punishment challenge may ultimately succeed. Only time will tell,
and time is one thing that civil contemners have in great supply.
SETH J. KELEY
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